• mspencer712@programming.dev
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    3 days ago

    Passkeys make plausible deniability more difficult. “This user name isn’t necessarily associated with my real world identity” permits some important good things.

    • 2xsaiko@discuss.tchncs.de
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      1 day ago

      The kicker is this used to be solved with passwordless webauthn, the same standard, until some morons decided that resident keys were the way to go (they aren’t)

        • Natanael@infosec.pub
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          1 day ago

          That’s literally no different from a regular password manager or having a 2FA TOTP code app set up for it

          • mspencer712@programming.dev
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            13 hours ago

            Are you sure? TOTP secrets can be exported. I think passkey implementations explicitly prevent that. Unless I’m missing an option to export passkey creds, e.g. print them out.

            That same disaster recovery feature (which I need) also helps avoid a future where every forum and avenue of dissent requires dis-repudiation via passkeys. It’s a weird nuance, ascribing a social effect to a simple ability to back up your keys without backing up your whole phone.

            • Natanael@infosec.pub
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              12 hours ago

              Passkeys can be synchronized, but aren’t intended to be exported raw as they’re meant to be used with a TPM / secure element chip or equivalent secure hardware to protect the key in use. Bitwarden can synchronize them.

              Also, they intentionally create distinct keys per site, so you can’t link multiple accounts using the same passkey / hardware security key.