• Sephitard9001 [he/him]@hexbear.net
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    1 month ago

    You could have attempted to contradict any one of the seven main points he brings up in the beginning if you wanted to be taken seriously. Hitting your keyboard while shouting “moron” is not a compelling argument.

    • miz [any, any]@hexbear.net
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      1 month ago

      don’t know why but I felt like pulling out the bolded headers of each of the seven points

      FIRST, there is simply no evidence from before 24 February 2022 that Putin wanted to conquer Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia. Proponents of the conventional wisdom cannot point to anything Putin wrote or said that indicates he was bent on conquering Ukraine.

      SECOND, there is no evidence that Putin was preparing a puppet government for Ukraine, cultivating pro-Russian leaders in Kyiv, or pursuing any political measures that would make it possible to occupy the entire country and eventually integrate it into Russia.

      THIRD, Putin did not have anywhere near enough troops to conquer Ukraine.

      FOURTH, in the months before the war started, Putin tried to find a diplomatic solution to the brewing crisis.

      FIFTH, immediately after the war began, Russia reached out to Ukraine to start negotiations to end the war and work out a modus vivendi between the two countries.

      SIXTH, putting Ukraine aside, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Putin was contemplating conquering any other countries in eastern Europe.

      SEVENTH, hardly anyone in the West argued that Putin had imperial ambitions from the time he took the reins of power in 2000 until the Ukraine crisis started on 22 February 2014. At that point, he suddenly became an imperial aggressor. Why? Because Western leaders needed a reason to blame him for causing the crisis.